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Postdramatic approaches to performance and Stanislavsky’s methodology seemingly 
occupy divergent performance traditions. Nonetheless, both traditions often require 
performers to mine their own lives (albeit to different ends) and operate in an experiential 
realm that demands responsiveness to and within the live moment of performing. It is this 
realm that I explore in this paper, through an analysis of Quarantine Theatre’s Wallflower 
(2015). I argue that Wallflower represents an example of postdramatic practice that 
blends a poetics of failure with a psychophysical dramaturgical approach that can be 
aligned with Stanislavsky’s concepts of Affective Memory and Active Analysis. I also 
adopt Carnicke’s use of the term ‘active experiencing’ to describe Wallflower’s 
dramaturgical process. I argue that Wallflower provides a useful case study of practice 
that challenges the binary opposition between dramatic and postdramatic that is still 
prevalent in theatre and performance studies scholarship, and suggest that the application 
of aspects of Stanislavsky’s System, nuanced by cognitive neuroscience, can expand the 
theorization of postdramatic theatre, which in turn generates techniques that can prove 
valuable in the rehearsal of dramatic theatre itself. 
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Post/dramatic 
This paper is inspired by a performance of Quarantine Theatre’s current touring 
production Wallflower, which I first attended at HOME, Manchester in 2015; a piece 
described on the company’s website as ‘a dance marathon’ in which the performers are 
challenged to remember ‘every dance they’ve ever danced’.1 What interested me about 
this piece is that, although its dramaturgy aligns with postdramatic theatre paradigms, it 
also involves processes that can be closely compared to Stanislavskian methodology, 
albeit without any recourse to characterization or mimetic representation. Yet it has 
been common in Performance Studies scholarship to regard Stanislavski’s System as 
synonymous with psychological realism. This is logical given the historical association 
between the development of the System and the reign of Naturalism, along with 
Stanislavski’s close work with Chekhov. However, in recent years champions of 
Stanislavski’s work have pointed to or re-evaluated his relevance for theatre in the 
twenty first century. For instance both Sharon Carnicke and Bella Merlin, in respective 
publications, have suggested that the System has value in relation to a range of forms 
beyond psychological realism,2 whilst Graham Stephenson (2012), suggests the system 
is applicable, not only to forms within the dramatic tradition but to postdramatic theatre 
also.3 Similarly Yana Meerzon has recently demonstrated correspondences between 
Stanislavski’s System and the practice of the Wooster Group.4 Yes this is a rare 
exception. As Stephenson asserts, ‘Stanislavski and the System have often been ignored 
as (presumably) obsolete and irrelevant – as their absence from many books on 
postmodern or postdramatic theatre attest.’5  
 
Of course the System does not lead obviously beyond the dramatic paradigm, since 
Stanislavski worked out and theorised his praxis within its terms and according to a 
 2 
Humanist ideology. In this respect, the System generally carries with it the ideological 
baggage of a logocentric theatrical tradition, to which postdramatic theatre is generally 
posited against.6 Within the terms of Hans-Thies Lehmann’s postdramatic theory drama 
is, by its very nature logocentric, due to its subordination to the ‘primacy of text’ and 
construction of a totalising ‘fictive cosmos’ in which ‘wholeness, illusion and world 
representation are inherent’. 7 Lehmann theorizes postdramatic theatre, conversely, 
through an emphasis on the liveness of the theatre event, where the liveness becomes a 
material of it rather than an element that is effaced or suppressed by the fictional ‘text-
cosmos’. Thus he emphasises ‘the dimension of the time ‘shared’ by the performers and 
the audience as a processuality that is on principle open’.8 Yet he also acknowledges 
that the postdramatic cannot fully escape the representational apparatus when he 
distinguishes it from live art on the basis of the process of repetition inimical to all 
theatre production (whereas live art aims to realize unique moments), and in his 
concession that postdramatic ‘does not mean a theatre that exists “beyond” drama, 
without any relation to it’.9  
 
Some scholars writing on postdramatic theatre have followed suit by acknowledging the 
inescapable presence of dramatic and representational elements within postdramatic 
practice.10Nevertheless, in Acts and Apparitions (2013), Liz Tomlin has convincingly 
identified an ‘existing and prevalent philosophical and ideological binary of a 
conservative, logocentric dramatic versus a radical, poststructuralist postdramatic’ 
within scholarship on postdramatic theatre, which she finds problematic.11 As she 
writes,  
With notable exceptions, the dramatic/postdramatic binary is thus consistently upheld on the 
perceived distinction between the ‘illusion of the ‘present tense’ of dramatic fiction where the 
‘there and then’ poses as the ‘here and now’ and the emphasis within ‘non-representational’ or  
‘presentational’ postdramatic practice on the present time of the actual event, its liveness, its 
direct relationship to the audience in time and space.12 
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Tomlin deconstructs this binary through the lens of Derridean poststructuralism to show 
how some postdramatic works can also be considered to contain the spectre of 
logocentrism and how some forms of drama resist logocentric reinscription. I am not 
concerned with analysing disruptions or inscriptions of logocentrism in postdramatic 
theatre, in this paper. However I echo Tomlin’s assertion that this binary is a false one, 
which is often inscribed to support claims as to the radicalism or innovation of the 
postdramatic as if postdramatic work has no efficacy otherwise. Beginning from this 
premise it seems credible to consider the value of applying Stanislavski’s System to 
postdramatic theatre work, alongside theory associated with the postdramatic. I 
particularly engage with his concepts of affective memory and “experiencing”, 
reframing these concepts through the lens of cognitive neuroscience, which, according 
to McConachie, can help us find ‘common ground between “theatre” and 
“performance”, as they are usually defined’ and ‘may help to heal our institutional 
divisions’.13 By analysising Quarantine’s Wallflower within the framework, my aim, 
then, is to explore how a dialogue between the dramatic and the postdramatic can 
expand the theorization of the postdramatic and elucidate some of the processes in the 
making and experiencing of such work – both for performers and spectators.  
 
Emotion and Affectivity in Postdramatic Theatre  
Distinctions made between dramatic and postdramatic theatre are often aligned with a 
distinction between acting and performance. In place of character-based acting, 
postdramatic theatre more commonly adopts the playing of personae or task-based 
strategies, which performers enact as “performer-selves”, and often without the 
projection of emotion that is central to dramatic acting as Michael Kirby argued in his 
seminal paper from 1972: ‘Acting and Not-Acting’.14 Here Kirby proposed a continuum 
 4 
from the emotionally invested ‘complex acting’ of dramatic theatrical forms to the more 
dispassionate, functional ‘not acting’ of task-based ‘non-matrixed’ performances.  
Although he associates not-acting with performance art rather than theatre per se, he 
was writing before the advent of the postdramatic, which often crosses into the realm of 
performance art and shares many of its sensibilities.  Kirby also includes the somewhat 
murkier category of ‘simple acting’, which might involve ‘a psychic or emotional 
component’ and which, along with ‘not acting’, can be manifested in postdramatic 
theatre.15 Kirby’s model is now somewhat outdated given the diversity of theatre and 
performance forms in the twenty first century, including the growth of  “reality theatre”. 
It is also limited because he only considers emotion in relation to fiction - in so far as it 
is acted or ‘feigned’ - and does not consider the broader affective relations with 
audiences within the duration of the performance event.  
 
When considering this material dimension in relation to the postdramatic, Lehmann 
draws on Lyotard’s notion of an ‘energetic theatre’, elaborating that it is ‘a theatre not 
of meaning but of ‘forces, intensities, present affects’.16 He therefore implicitly 
highlights the putting into play of the live experiential dimension within postdramatic 
theatre as a potential aspect of its dramaturgy. Similarly Sarah Jane Bailes (2011) notes 
that postdramatic theatre engenders ‘intensities and mood states’ rather than emotions 
that ‘service the development of character and linear plot’.17 I’ll develop this later, for 
now it is suffice to note that the affective dimension has only recently begun to be 
explored in postdramatic theatre.18 This is perhaps because, a common approach in a 
large body of theatre work that can be described as postdramatic has been a tendency 
for irony as a substitute for emotion – from the work of pioneers like Forced 
Entertainment and the Wooster Group to more recently formed companies, such as Gob 
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Squad and Made in China. Irony introduces a self-conscious reflexivity into the act of 
performing, which, following the Brechtian tradition of distanciation rather than 
Stanislavskian immersion, is usually associated with a self-reflexive deconstruction of 
familiar narrative and representational forms, to draw attention to the performance 
situation as a performance and/or explore the performativity of identity through 
citational aesthetics. In Dramatic theatre self-consciousness is usually considered as 
signaling a lack of skill or technique as it disrupts the illusion of the fictive world and 
embodied character. On the other hand, in many examples of postdramatic theatre an 
apparent, or performed, lack of skill is an approach that is often appropriated precisely 
to ‘derail stage conventions [and] the ambitions of dramatic integrity’ and challenge 
‘conventional standards of virtuosity.’19 Bailes has termed this approach ‘a poetics of 
failure’ in the sense that it links both to the adoption of failure as performance strategy 
and, dramaturgically, to poststructuralist critiques of logocentric grand narratives (the 
“failure” of representation itself). Bailes outlines a taxonomy of failure that includes, as 
a performance mode, ‘stuttering, stumbling, bumbling, bungling … unconvincing 
acting, coping (or not), awkwardness, and inability’ and, in dramaturgical composition, 
‘the use of chance, real-time tasks, endurance and repetition’ as well as ‘the 
incorporation of process, accidents and mistakes on stage’, which create ‘structural 
vulnerability’.20 In a general sense, signs of failure in postdramatic performances 
function as markers of authenticity that either signal the presence of the performer 
alongside a role or performed representation and/or disrupt the mechanisms of 
representation through the break down of performance structures. 
 
The poetics of failure is now firmly established in postdramatic theatre as a 
deconstructive strategy, but has also earned some criticism in recent academic writing. 
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Tomlin, for instance, suggests it has become somewhat of a derivative cliché: ‘the new 
mark of artistic sophistication and success’ with its own prescriptive rules.21 
Appropriated derivatively as a performance style, “failure” has perhaps no more effect 
than signifying its own activity of self-reflexivity, as Tomlin suggests. She gives one 
example of the now familiar convention of ‘offering the illusion that the piece is 
unrehearsed, and that the performers are inadequately constructing the show in the 
space and time of the performance’.22 Through this kind of appropriation ‘failure’ 
becomes a represented act, albeit within a poststructuralist framework. This is not to 
suggest that such an approach lacks legitimacy or efficacy but rather that in such 
instances the dramaturgical framework is not open to the materiality of the theatre event 
and/or the shared experience with the audience in any essentially different way to a 
dramatic theatre piece. On the other hand, where the possibility of failure remains open 
through dramaturgical strategies, such as those identified by Baile, failure can operate in 
generative ways that enable genuinely authentic encounters between performers and 
spectators, as well as disrupt the power economies of the theatre as a representational 
apparatus.  
 
I cite Tomlin’s example because it relates quite closely to the dramaturgical 
composition of Quarantine’s Wallflower, which can in many ways be classified 
according to Bailes’s taxonomy of failure. However, this piece is (largely) constructed 
in the duration of the performance (performed in both ninety minute and five hour 
versions) rather than giving the illusion of such and thus consists of unrehearsed 
material (alongside some rehearsed material, which I discuss later). Therefore, we might 
say that in that challenge it sets its performers - of remembering, every dance they’ve 
ever danced - Wallflower begins from a premise of failure, which is also built into its 
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dramaturgical framework. The memories and accompanying dances that form 
Wallflower’s content are newly recalled in the performance event and performed as they 
are recalled (over 1,000 dances have been archived at the time of writing) and so each 
performance is unique, in part, because there is no fixed script or score.  
 
Wallflower 
My analysis here is shaped through a triangulation of my experience as a spectator at 
the event and the experiences of the Director, Richard Gregory, and performer James 
Monaghan. All quotations from Gregory and Monaghan are recorded verbatim from 
interviews conducted in February 2016 unless cited to other sources.23  
 
Wallflower’s performance space consists of a dance floor with seating on three sides 
and a wooden wall on the fourth. When the audience enters the space the piece has 
already begun and we watch three performers taking turns to remember and perform 
dances, or fragments of dances, from their personal history, as they also describe and 
narrate the situations, encounters and events associated with them. When not on stage 
the performers sit amongst the audience, who are occasionally addressed collectively or 
individually during the performance. Another performer, seated amongst the audience, 
functions as an archivist, recording all the dances in writing as a part of an archive that 
grows with every performance and each new dance, whilst “DJ” Greg Akehurst plays 
music or song recordings from a laptop to accompany the dances (sometimes requested 
by the performers, other times unprompted).  
 
When taking their turn on stage to perform the performers use sense memory to try to 
recall details about a particular dance and the circumstances surrounding it: what song 
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was playing or, failing that, what the mood of the music was; who they were with; what 
the environment was like; how they remember feeling at that time. Each performer’s 
memories are triggered by the dances or stories of fellow performers in a kind of 
feedback loop. As Monaghan described it:  
We’d get up when we could remember something and that was often triggered by 
something someone had done before, by association almost. Someone does a physical 
act, they speak; it could be anything. It could just be the fact that it was silent for a 
second and you think “oh yeah I remember this silent dance” and you stand up and you 
do one.  
 
As many of the memories are either new ones, or recalled differently in each 
performance, the overall content of any specific performance is partly based on ‘chance’ 
occurrence, arising from the performers’ responses to each other and coloured with their 
own general emotional state on that particular performance day. This lends the piece the 
kind of ‘structural vunerability’ that Bailes refers to. As Gregory reflected in our 
interview, ‘it can be extraordinarily powerful or really boring, or it can be an abject 
failure’. Indeed, at the performance I attended, my experience in the early moments of 
the performance was one of slight irritation and disappointment. As the performers 
began to articulate their memories and re-enact the dances connected to them, their 
manner was hesitant and their physicality was awkward in way that I took to be 
deliberately self-conscious and which I initially perceived as an adopted and clichéd use 
of a poetics of failure as a performance style. However, as the performance progressed, 
changes started to happen that began to alter this perception; at times the performers 
appeared to become more immersed in and affected by their memories in a way that was 
not initially apparent. As this occurred I came to realise that what I had initially 
perceived as a performed act of remembering was actually a process of psychophysical 
recall, or affective memory: a process that is largely confined to the rehearsal process in 
dramatic theatre, but here is an essential part of Wallflower’s composition. Whilst I’m 
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not suggesting that Stanislavski’s affective memory was used as a deliberate concept or 
technique in the making of Wallflower, I’m suggesting that it can be closely compared 
to the process used by Quarantine in the development of its dramaturgy. 
 
From Affective Memory to Active Experiencing  
As well documented, affective memory is the technique whereby an actor attempts to 
recall past experiences and revive associated feelings that may be analogous to the 
circumstances and events experienced by a character in a fictional role. Up to the late 
twentieth Century the standard understanding of this concept in Western acting was 
coloured by Strasberg’s adoption of affective memory as a discrete concept that became 
the cornerstone of the American Method and by early Russian translations of his work, 
which helped create the impressions that this technique was later abandoned by 
Stanislavski and superseded by his development of the method of physical actions.24  
Therefore affective memory became associated with an approach that was cerebral, 
internally-focused and self indulgent, with the method of physical actions positioned as 
a kind of corrective that focused instead on the actor’s body and physical actions in 
space.25 However more recent translations of Stanislavski’s writing by Jean Benedetti 
and scholarship by Carnicke and Merlin, among others, have challenged this binary 
understanding, demonstrating how Stanislavski’s praxis was approached, even in its 
early articulations, as a psychophysical process: that is, a process ‘where body and 
psychology (brain, emotions and imagination) were mutually dependent’ and within 
which affective memory was conceived as part of a broader integrated system, rather 
than a discrete concept. 26 
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The overarching aim of affective memory is to create an emotional connection between 
the actor’s ‘self’ and role that will enable the actor to create a life-like and emotionally 
authentic performance. Yet, as Merlin points out, one of the difficulties in the use of 
affective memory for the development of a fictional character is that memories are 
subjective and unique to the individual’s own experiences. Further, memories are not 
static phenomena and our perception of experiences and events can alter through 
recollection. By extension the emotions connected to particular memories can change, 
whereas an actor will need to repeat his or her performance many times.27 In fact it can 
be argued that the more a particular memory is used the more its affectivity diminishes 
so that a memory that might prove useful to an actor’s performance on one occasion 
might not do subsequently. Moreover, emotions are connected to the body and subject 
to the mechanisms of the unconscious. As Merlin puts it, ‘Who's to say that an actor 
will even be able to locate at will an appropriate affective memory, when often we 
unconsciously suppress an emotion at source through our own involuntary self-
censorship?’28  
 
Of course, Stanislavsky was well aware of memory’s subjectivity and fallibility – as he 
articulated in the famous analogy of searching through a large house with countless 
rooms and cupboards and drawers for a tiny bead ‘that first glinted and then was gone 
forever’. He advised his actors, ‘don’t for a moment imagine you can retrieve a feeling 
that has gone forever. Tomorrow […] you will remember something else. Don’t 
imagine you can return to yesterday’s memory, be content with today’s. Learn to accept 
memories that have come to life afresh.29  
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Stanislavski also believed that memories were distilled and purified over time, leaving 
only the most emotionally potent features; and that time synthesises experiences that 
have evoked similar feelings so that a memory of a single experience can evoke other 
memories and associated feelings. ‘All these traces of similar experiences and feelings 
are distilled into a single, wider, deeper memory’, he wrote, ‘there is nothing 
superfluous in it, only what is most essential. This is a synthesis of all like feelings’.30 In 
this then he drew no distinction between authentic and inauthentic affective memories, 
acknowledging that most of the feelings we experience are recurrent feelings. Although 
he welcomed ‘first time feelings’ when they occur in rare moments during an actor’s 
performance, as they ‘intensify the truth of our emotions’, he believed that they are only 
useful in short bursts, as they are unstable and unpredictable. Thus he advised the actor 
to cultivate the use of ‘the repeated, the recurrent feelings which our Emotion Memory 
prompts. Learn, first and foremost, to use them. They are more accessible to us.’31 
 
Stanislavski’s theories were informed by the science of his day, yet indicate an intuitive 
grasp of physiological and cognitive processes that have since been more fully 
understood through developments in neuroscience. Rhonda Blair draws on nureoscience 
to nuance the concept of affective memory by making a distinction between emotions 
and feelings. She explains that whilst emotions are ‘neural or chemical patterns’, 
biological responses that involve a change in the physical body/brain, feelings ‘are 
conscious mental formulations [through which] choice and decision-making come into 
play.’32 Furthermore, the neurological processing of memory is determined not so much 
by neurons themselves as the connections between neurons; every time the brain 
registers an experience the synapses (transmission of signals between nerve cells) in the 
brain are changed, and in retrieving memories new proteins have to be made to re-store 
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that memory. This means that neural pathways are altered by experience and by 
subsequent recollections of experiences: ‘regardless of the kind of memory, 
reconsolidation is involved in memory retrieval’. 33 Here Blair quotes Wilson (1998): 
‘So memory neither produces something completely new, nor simply reproduces 
something that already exists. Instead, memory is “literally manufactured”  [it] is always 
an “imaginative reconstruction,” a constant variation without a discrete origin.’34 This is 
directly connected to emotions, as each remembering is also a ‘new event’ or 
experience that is reconsolidated in relation to the moment and environment in which it 
is retrieved and which becomes part of the memory’s future remembering. This means 
that any recollection is never felt in precisely the same way.  
 
On this basis Blair argues that the common understanding in standard actor training of 
affective memory as the truthful recovery or re-experiencing of a previous emotion 
needs some qualification. The neuroscientific perspectiveallows the actor to work from 
the perspective that there is no “objective” authentic self, past or otherwise, to engage 
but only the self-in-the-now of the rehearsal or performance.’ It also points to a 
conception of character as a series of behaviours, a process rather than a ‘discrete entity’ 
and, therefore, reinforces the actor’s freedom to think creatively in imagining a role by 
shifting emphasis from the search to uncover and communicate psychological ‘truths’ to 
‘psychoemotional improvisations related to the scene or play’.35 Blair does not pursue 
these points further, other than noting that neuroscientific perspectives give credence to 
later developments of Stanislavski’s system: the method of physical actions and active 
analysis in particular.  
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Even in his earlier experiments with the System, Stanislavski was keenly aware that 
memory makes a biological impression, that it resides not just in the mind but also in 
the body, and thus that physical actions are ‘also an important stimulus to feeling’.36 
This led him to the development of the method of physical actions, and later active 
analysis. Importantly, the method of physical actions was formulated as a technique 
through which actors can learn to access emotions as a ‘by-product’ rather than ‘end-
product of an acting technique’, as Merlin explains:  
If emotion was so elusive, perhaps it could be more effectively stimulated, not through 
directly assaulting the emotion-centre itself, but indirectly, by provoking the will centre 
(the body) and coercing the thought centre (the imagination). In other words, if the 
performer actively did something and imaginatively committed to what he or she was 
doing, appropriate emotions would arise accordingly.37  
 
Carnicke, along with Merlin, prefers the approach of active analysis, which has subtle 
differences with the method of physical actions, although is often used interchangeably. 
Whilst the method of physical actions focuses on the development of a logical ‘score’ of 
individual actions in a scene, active analysis involves improvising around a play’s given 
circumstances to discover ‘the underlying structure of action’ - which, in dramatic 
realism, is related to a character’s ‘intentional action’ and is grounded in ‘the 
character’s rhythmic energy and trajectory of desire’.38 Similarly, Merlin suggests that 
active analysis is a more holistic psychophysical approach in which ‘the logic of 
sequence was less important than the experiential discoveries made’.39  
 
We appear to have moved some distance from postdramatic theatre here but the 
significance of active analysis is that it opens up Stanislavsky’s system to approaches 
that extend beyond psychological realism and, as Merlin suggests, is ‘the most exciting 
way Stanislavsky’s theories can be transported into contemporary theatre practice’.40 
The principle of discovery through improvisation overlaps with contemporary devising 
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practices and active analysis is particularly relevant to Wallflower, where affective 
memories both stimulate and are stimulated by the physical activity of dancing (dancing 
is employed in a loose sense and is at times manifest as simple rhythmic or repeated 
movement). Monaghan articulated this process in the following way: ‘you get a specific 
detail, and you’re trying to tell a story and you just start doing it – and suddenly it can 
escalate that feeling of being there’. Here Monaghan intuitively highlights experiential 
discovery through a form of active analysis; although I prefer to adopt the term ‘active 
experiencing’, which Carnicke appropriates from cognitive science research on actor 
processes by Noice and Noice ‘as a twenty-first century synonym for Active 
Analysis’.41 This term is more appropriate to a postdramatic context as it shifts 
emphasis away from the rehearsal of a dramatic text to the performance dimension 
itself.  
 
Although the goal for the performers in Wallflower is the evocation of memories rather 
than the generation of emotion specifically, emotion is evoked as an inevitable by-
product of the physical duress of the dancing and the psychological duress of both 
evoking memories and of collectively, in Monaghan’s words, ‘live curating’ the piece in 
the duration of its performance. It can be argued that the semi- improvised composition 
of the performance has the resulting affect that the performers have less control over the 
memories that are evoked and any corresponding emotions that may surface. ‘We go to 
so many different spaces, I mean broken up, gone mad’, Monaghan reflected. 
You are using things, memories, experiences that you don't always know how you feel about 
them until you do them … you’re generating new material constantly and the material just 
happens to be connected to many, many emotions and memories that you haven’t fully 
comprehended or processed or for some of the performers they’d processed them and didn’t 
want to revisit them but they’d ran out of dances. 
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The memories themselves and associated emotions are not primary experiences but their 
reconstruction during the performance event is. And within Wallflower’s performance 
structure, the use of active experiencing as performance material (arguably) elicits 
primary emotions more frequently and more visibly than in a dramatic or pre-rehearsed 
representation, emotions not only connected to memory traces but also to the 
performance situation itself. It is evident in the ways the performers sometimes inhabit 
the stage and their own bodies: it is evident through Monaghan’s (unconscious?) 
nervous laugh, which we hear repeatedly, or performer Sonia Hughes’s occasional, 
almost inaudible, mumblings as she appears embarrassed by a memory she is revisiting 
(such as the dance when she realised she was in love or her inept attempt at tap 
dancing). These are not ‘pre-rehearsed strategies to enhance the ‘present-time’ illusion 
of performance’ such as Tomlin finds in examples of postdramatic theatre that 
derivatively appropriate a poetics of failure,42 but a representation of memories as they 
are being neurologically reconstituted. Thus, whereas performed failure as postdramatic 
style creates a veil of irony that shields performers’ natural performance anxieties, the 
possibility of failure inbuilt into the dramaturgical framework, as it is in Wallflower, 
opens up the affective experiential dimension of performance more explicitly. Whilst I 
am not suggesting that the performers and spectators necessarily feel more or more 
authentically in this performance than in dramatic theatre, I am suggesting that the 
affective responses of the audience are woven into the fabric of the performance and 
have a more direct impact on the resulting performance composition and that this can 
affect the process of recollection itself. In fact, since memories are rooted in affect, one 
could even go so far as to suggest that audiences responses (however minimal) might 
also give rise to feelings in the performer that trigger specific memories; as was 
intimated by Monaghan when he commented: 
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You develop small relationships with people, and every time this is a new memory, with a new 
presence and new people in front of you. There was this guy who laughed once when I put my 
hands on my knees and smelt my shin pads and he said “I do the same thing’. When you’re 
doing this it’s important to know that these are the people you’re sharing these memories with 
…no matter how much we use memories we’re in this now and creating this together. 
 
However, although the inclusion of the audience as a considered element is a recurring 
aspect of Quarantine’s theatre work, such direct participation is rare in Wallflower. This 
means that it is not primarily the spectators’ direct engagement with the performers that 
helps to shape the resultant form of the performance, but their indirect, even 
unconscious, energetics and the performers are required to be responsive to that energy 
in ‘curating’ (pulling together) the overall composition of the performance.  
 
Experiencing and Flow 
I noted earlier both Lehmann’s and Baile’s descriptions of postdramatic theatre’s 
affective dimension in terms of energies, affects and intensities rather than performed or 
projected emotion. Blair does not use such terminology in her examination of the 
neurological processes of emotion, partly because she focuses on the processes in the 
brain. Like Blair, Eric Shouse also distinguishes between the unconscious and 
consciousness in relation to emotion, but with different semantics. Drawing on 
psychology and philosophy, rather than neuroscience, his model posits feelings and 
emotions as both conscious formulations of sensation, albeit with subtle differences 
(emotion being more performative). The term ‘affect’ on the other hand describes 
bodily intensities or excitations that are non-conscious and abstract. According to 
Shouse, ‘At any moment hundreds, perhaps thousands of stimuli impinge upon the 
human body and the body responds by infolding them all at once and registering them 
as an intensity. Affect is this intensity.’ Furthermore, because affect ‘is unformed and 
unstructured it can be transmitted between bodies.’ Shouse clarifies that this does not 
mean that one person takes on another’s feelings but, rather, is about the way in which 
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bodies ‘infold’ affective resonances from each other.’43 Thus Schouse puts emphasis on 
affect as a physiological process that is not only registered throughout the body but also 
on and by other bodies.  
 
Although his work is applied to the field of media and cultural studies, Schouse’s use of 
the term ‘infolding’ has resonance with Fischer Lichte’s concept of the ‘autopoietic’ 
feedback loop in in live performance.44 Similarly, this refers to the transference of 
energetics between and amongst spectators and performers, which, however subtly and 
imperceptibly, influence the mood, atmosphere and ultimately the performance of a 
theatre piece. As Fischer Lichte notes, in conventional dramatic theatre this feedback 
loop might involve largely internal processes on the spectator’s part, or subtle 
responses, such as changes in breathing, sighing or shuffling, which exceed the 
economy of affects that are shaped and directed within the fictional cosmos itself.  
However, since the performative turn, ‘The feedback loop as a self-referential, 
autopoietic system enabling a fundamentally open, unpredictable process emerged as 
the defining principle of theatrical work.’ As part of this shift, which involves the 
presence of the audience as a principle feature of a performance, the ‘functioning of the 
feedback loop’ often becomes visible.45   
 
In Wallflower the autopoietic system becomes visible in several ways: the process 
through which performers’ memories are often triggered by the memories or actions of 
other performers; direct engagement with spectators (as in the example given); the 
spatial configuration, which dictates that spectators can see each other as well as feel 
and sense each other’s corporeal responses; finally, the positioning of the performers 
when ‘resting’ amongst the audience, so there is a confusion between performer and 
spectator.  This means that the energetic ebbs and flows of the performance are, 
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arguably, more diffuse than a conventional ‘end-on’ configuration. A key aspect of 
theatre’s autopoietic feedback loop is that it is not simply a two-way system but multi-
directional and rhizomatic, hence its flow of energy is unpredictable, depending ‘as 
much on the actors’ ability to mobilize energy at any given point during the 
performance as on every single audience member’s level of responsiveness.’46   
 
I would argue, that it is in the moments of ‘failure’ that I described above, where 
Wallflower’s performance structure becomes vulnerable to the theatre’s precarious 
liveness, that the feedback loop is most unpredictable. These moments are sometimes 
uncomfortable as we watch the performers clumsily perform dances or forget mid-step, 
or struggle to recall the specific details of a memory. Yet they are also highly charged as 
we witness their frustrations at not being able to remember exactly, their exhaustion and 
despair when they are simply coping, negotiating in the moment where to go/what to do 
next, and relief in moments of recovery, or rescue from another performer or spectator. 
The affective resonances that we infold from the performers also form into feelings 
(anxiety, hilarity, embarrassment, empathy) that resonate, in turn, circulating back 
through the space. As a spectator I become more aware of the here and now of the 
performance moment, of my own body and the bodies of others also watching the 
performance. Significantly, these are also the moments when engagements with 
spectators most often occur. Gregory articulates it as follows:   
It’s about trying to work with frames to create spaces where you can see the working out, you 
can see people are going through the process of making choices and sometimes getting them 
wrong, and that’s alright. And I guess ultimately there’s something that is then passed on to the 
audience’s experience of it, that I want to present it in such a way that they can work it out as 
well. 
 
This focus on the process of ‘working out’ is also a focus on active experiencing within 
the performance event - before and with the audience who are actively experiencing 
also.  
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Although the emphasis on the “present time” performance and its incorporation within 
dramaturgical composition is a factor that is often used to distinguish postdramatic from 
dramatic theatre, it should be emphasised that the ‘present time’ material dimension of 
performance was a key consideration also in Stanislavsky’s practice. What is often 
overlooked in reductive accounts that bind his System to a theatre of psychological 
realism, is that “experience” functions as a primary concept in his system; not just in its 
use as rehearsal material but also its activation within the performance dimension. 
Experiencing in Stanislavski’s discourse is different to ‘active experiencing’ as I have 
appropriated the term here as a form of active analysis. Whilst the latter is a conscious 
technique (or integration of techniques) used in the rehearsal room, ‘experiencing’, as 
Carnicke notes, does not relate to any specific, concrete technique but to ‘a creative 
state that the system can, with luck, foster’.47 Stephenson argues that in the ‘creative 
state’, the actor is ‘alive and responsive to whatever is happening on stage […] in a state 
of heightened awareness and receptivity’ and suggests that its achievement is the 
ultimate goal of Stanislavsky’s system. Where achieved, the resulting performance ‘will 
not be fixed but will develop and evolve, alert and responsive to the differences in the 
way the actor is thinking and feeling and also to what his or her fellow actors are doing 
onstage.’48 We could add to this that the actor in the creative state is responsive to the 
affective resonances circulating from and amongst the audience also. Although 
Stanislavski stressed the importance of eliminating self-consciousness in the actor’s 
performance - which inhibits concentration and creates unwelcome ‘muscular 
tension’,49 he also stressed the importance of remaining self-aware, which he believed is 
fundamental to the creative state. ‘The actor’s human emotions, which run parallel to 
the feelings of the role, must remain alive’, he said. He also wrote that ‘the things 
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around us influence the way we feel. And that happens not only in real life but on the 
stage, too’.50  
 
Carnicke suggests the contemporary analogue of experiencing is Psychologist Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi’s concept of ‘flow’, which refers to a sense of totality experienced by 
athletes and actors at moments of peak performance in which they are entirely within 
the moment whilst paradoxically experience a feeling of watching themselves 
perform.51 There is no loss of “self” in flow – which would also suggest a loss of 
control – but a kind of focused attention where the emotions are harnessed, ‘not just 
contained and channelled, but positive, energized, and aligned with the task at hand’.52  
 
In dramatic theatre the tasks are directed toward the inner and outer action of the play 
(to energising the characters’ intentional actions and desires). Yet a dramatic theatre 
performance consists of rehearsed material that is repeated over several performances 
and, in order to enter a creative state of flow successively, the dramatic actor must be 
able to accomplish, in each performance, the illusion that the character is experiencing 
his or her circumstances and feelings in the here and now. In this sense, if we accord 
with Kirby’s model, we might argue that the dramatic actor has a more complex job 
than Wallflower’s performers. But this is a difference of kind not of degree. In 
Wallflower, the performers are constructing the piece at the same time as attempting to 
recall memories and filter and digest the thoughts and emotions that recall sometimes 
evokes, as well as coping with the physical exhaustion of dancing itself. Gregory 
described it as follows: ‘They’re composing as they make the piece. They’re composing 
text, they’re deciding what’s good to follow what, what are the repetitions. They’re live 
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directing themselves and mise-en-scene; they’re deciding where they should be in the 
space, and pace, and what the relationship with the audience is.’ 
 
Monaghan referred to ten simple ‘techniques’ that the performers used to aid the 
composition. These included: ‘story then dance; only dance; only story; shift (mood or 
topic); start as far into the story as you can and end it before it finishes’. He added:  
They weren’t like a methodology or anything like that, it was more like if you can remember 
four of these things in the show, well done. You never felt like you were choosing those 
techniques, you couldn’t. You were highly immersed in remembering live and talking to the 
people around you. The techniques were a way of trying to curate a show that … we weren’t 
sure where it was going – because the one thing we couldn't control was if it was going to be 
good, bad, banal, so what we did have to do was to learn how to get in and out; that simple: get 
in and out. 
Although Gregory also denied the use of a specific methodology in Quarantine’s 
work, other than a ‘conversational approach’, he did speak about a certain 
‘technicality’ in words that echoed Monaghan’s, a technicality that is not explicit or 
self-reflexively acknowledged in the piece but operates on a semi-conscious level 
in the organic and apparent spontaneous flow of performers’ thoughts and actions 
and which, like all techniques, must be practiced and assimilated to muscular 
memory (forming synaptic patterning) in order to operate as such. Monaghan’s 
reflection - of being at the same ‘immersed’ whilst aware of the responsibility to 
create an aesthetic experience for the audience - whilst not precisely describing a 
state of flow, bears on its immanent duality. The techniques he describes (which he 
also refers to as ‘work mechanisms’) create the underlying structures within 
Wallflower’s overall framework through which the performers’ energetics, and the 
energetics feeding back from and amongst the audience, are infolded and 
channelled as they collectively curate the emerging material and which aid them in 
achieving (when they achieve) a state of creative flow. Whilst I am not suggesting 
that the adoption of Stanislavsky’s System is a precondition for performers to 
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experience flow, which can happen intuitively, intuition is elusive and cannot be 
relied upon to occur – an understanding which shaped Stanislavsky’s concept of 
experiencing. I am suggesting therefore that a practiced, psychophysical technique 
is necessary to create the conditions that can help performers to generate flow - and 
that this will bear close correlation to Stanislavsky’s techniques. After all his 
‘enduring pertinence’, as Merlin notes, is because he was, ‘simply untangling, and 
as far as possible, systematizing, natural human responses’.53   
 
Although I have focused so far on the improvisatory elements within Wallflower, 
the piece also contains pre-rehearsed dances from its growing archive. These 
dances, which Quarantine refer to as ‘the solos’, form a structural backbone within 
the piece and ‘are made up of our very poignant memories’, as Monaghan put it. 
For instance, the performance I attended included a solo by Sonia Hughes, which 
recounted a potentially dangerous visit to the Notting Hill Carnival (during which 
the crowd she was in escaped a near violent conflict with police) and a more 
intimate memory attached to unrequited love, whilst part of Monaghan’s solo 
involves a memory of being robbed at knifepoint in a nightclub. This material is 
notably more dramatic than many of the more banal moments (such as Monaghan 
dancing in his kitchen), much like what Stanislavsky termed ‘events’ in dramatic 
theatre, which occur ‘when an “impelling action” collides with a “counteraction,” 
producing conflict’.54 Although not every solo is included in every performance – 
Gregory selects which particular solos are to be performed on the performance day 
- they are relatively fixed and thus, as Gregory notes, ‘like any performance they 
shift but they don’t have quite the fragile quality of the other material’. The 
potentially reductive affects of repeatedly used memories that I referred to earlier, 
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is applicable here. Monaghan discussed this very issue in relation to the solos, 
which it is worth quoting at length: 
We found that the more we went back to it the more we found it difficult to recover that 
experience of being in the past; and that kept getting diluted. And then you think “this 
needs to go somewhere people are watching” and you try to go somewhere.… So one 
technique was always to try and remember something new about that experience or try to 
find something new, and it does happen … a moment in the show when I’ll say “oh I 
always thought it was this but I’ve remembered it was this” and that really elevates the 
experience of remembering it and you attach yourself, something you’ve forgotten or 
remembered wrong - you don’t know that but now it feels right, you know. It’s not a 
storage shelf, it’s not something you can just pick out, every time you remember a memory 
you re-imagine it.    
Again the use of technique is highlighted – although in this instance to tap into the 
emotional well of memory traces rather than to harness and channel the present affects 
of the performance situation. Monaghan’s metaphor of attaching and the degree to 
which the memory ‘feels right’ is significant, suggesting the need for a psychological or 
psychophysical hook to access the primary material and/or find a new relationship with 
the memory in order to activate its ‘re-imagining’. It is in those moments of 
‘attachment’ when the performers appear to enter a state of flow, when their dances are 
less hesitant, more accomplished. Yet conversely they appear to be transported by the 
memories away from the present moment. Certainly in my experience as a spectator 
there was a notable shift from when performers were simply recalling a memory to 
when they appeared to be immersed in it. In those instances I was also transported, 
absorbed in the physical commitment of the performers and their emotional connection 
to the memory, which infused their dancing with vitality, vicariously experiencing their 
flow. A similar experience is noted in a rehearsal blog by observer Dani Abulhawa, who 
put it simply: ‘From my distance I really notice the visibility of when the steps of this 
dance are being remembered, compared with moments when they are being…well, 
felt.’55Abulhawa also describes her own emotional response to Sonia’s solo in language 
that suggests the engendering of empathy: ‘the hairs on my arms are stood on end, and 
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my eyes are filled with tears. […] At the end of the solo everyone claps in a way that 
makes me think we all felt something similar.’ In the rehearsal Gregory, she notes, 
refers to the performance as ‘a kind of cathartic shaking off’, 56 using a term that might 
ordinarily be thought antithetical to postdramatic theatre. In this respect such moments 
of “high drama” might seem to undermine Wallflower’s reality-effects. Yet, far from 
claiming that the performers actions are non-representational, Gregory’s comment about 
framing reality, quoted earlier, articulates an acknowledgement that the apparatus 
through which theatre “operates” inevitably involves aesthetic selection and the 
manipulation of affects.  
 
These more obviously dramatic moments described contrast with the moments of 
awkwardness referred to earlier as they are accomplished, even virtuosic. Whereas 
when in a state of flow the performers harness and direct the energy in the room – 
where flow is not felt the energy is more scattered. In these moments the performers’ 
psycho-physicality appeared disjoined as they searched for a focus (attachment) for 
their imagination, as if groping to find an opening that would transport them inside the 
memory and activate a sense of flow (with Monaghan literally groping as he repeatedly 
made a circular movement with his hand before hesitantly trying out dance steps). 
Nevertheless, I suggest that in these moments where failure haunts the performance, the 
infolding of affective resonances between bodies in the space is most generative. As 
Bailes argues, failure does not only manifest as an error or an interruption of a system it 
can also be recuperative, signalling alternative possibilities. ‘Those broken moments, 
where things are glimpsed on stage that seem to be going badly, foreground a radical 
potential inherent within the labour of all live performance: that is, theatre’s facility as 
‘live’ action to de-compose and re-authenticate before us”.57  
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In terms of this performance, then, in its fundamental challenge ‘to remember every 
dance ever danced’ it is doomed to ultimately fail, not only because memory is rooted in 
unconscious affects, inflected with other memories and other ‘like feelings’, but because 
its formulation in consciousness is always an imaginative reconstruction in a present 
affective moment. Yet it is in the reconstitution of memory that we ‘re-authenticate’ it 
in the present, and through which we reshape our histories and reimagine our futures.  
Wallflower stages this process of imaginative reconstruction, and in doing so  
frames living moments of memory in the process of their reconsolidation in the real, a 
process in which the resonances of the spectators’ affective engagement are an active 
and activating presence. 
 
This is, perhaps, signalled at the end of Wallflower when, in a rare moment of 
theatricality, we are left with a piece of music playing, a spotlight on the now empty 
dance floor and a mirror ball slowly spinning, before the music fades out and the lights 
slowly come up. Here, in Wallflower’s final moments the dance floor is symbolically 
passed to the audience and space is given for our contemplation of the memories and 
feelings that have been evoked and reconstituted throughout the performance and our 
experience of the performance – which is already, itself, forming into a memory.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have aimed to demonstrate that a return to Stanislavsky’s praxis, nuanced 
by more recent research in cognitive science, has much to offer in the theorisation of 
postdramatic theatre and can further illuminate its affective, experiential dimension. 
Since Stanislavsky’s praxis evolved from the desire to elicit ephemeral physiological 
processes on stage during the moment of performance, and since the incorporation of 
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process into the dramaturgy of its performance is a common feature of postdramatic 
work, then there are insights to be gained from the practices that Stanislavsky initiated, 
if not from the System as a historical humanist technique. Equally postdramatic theories 
and strategies associated with the postdramatic - such as a ‘poetics of failure’ - may 
have value in the field of the dramatic. If, as Stanislavski’s writings claim, an 
emotionally authentic performance can only be achieved when the actor ‘experiences’ a 
role in every performance of it then this means that the actor must be actively 
experiencing, attuned to the unpredictable affective energetics in theatre’s autopoietic 
system and thus to the potential of failure inherent in all performance. Only then will 
the actor be able to improvise when accidents and errors occur - as unfailingly they do - 
to recuperate the momentary scattering of energy and re-energise his or her 
performance: in recuperation, s/he may discover too, new possibilities in the “life” of 
the character and the playing of the role. Cross-pollination between the institutions of 
theatre and performance, the dramatic and the postdramatic, can only engender further 
insights into the affective dimension of theatre events and their experiential processes. 
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